

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Counselor and Chairman
Policy Planning Council
Washington

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October 25, 1962

TO: Mr. McGeorge Bundy
FROM: S/P - W. W. Rostow
SUBJECT: Report Number Two of the Planning Subcommittee.

1. The Planning Subcommittee considered the situation as of Thursday morning, October 25, 1962. It wishes to call to the attention of the Executive Committee of the NSC the danger that our fundamental objectives, as stated by the President, may be corrupted unless we maintain momentum in our pressure on Cuba. Specifically, it is recommended that we add missile fuel to the list of prescribed items which might lead on, if necessary, to a general POL blockade should steps not be taken to eliminate the existing missiles and other offensive installations from Cuba. The political pressures mounting against us may leave us, unless we maintain momentum while we talk, with either a residual offensive military capability in Cuba, which could be beefed up by clandestine delivery of components, or in a negotiating position where assets in the Free World might have to be bargained away at the expense of our allies, to attain our Cuban objective.

2. Following is the status of planning problems referred to in Report Number One of October 24.

a. Papers touching on a political settlement are going forward to the Secretary of State.

b. The Navy is starting work on rules of engagement for a protracted war at sea; political consultation will take place through Mr. Kitchen.

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c. Political consultation will take place on DOD-JCS papers concerning increased pressure on Cuba, including alternative means for taking out missiles and installations.

d. A circular telegram was dispatched by the Department of State, clarifying the doctrinal base for our position.

e. The paper on the "Cuban base problem in perspective" went forward on October 24, 1962, to the Executive Committee.

3. The following additional planning tasks were initiated:

a. The drafting of guidance, on a contingency basis, explaining precisely why it was necessary to force a presumably innocent Bloc vessel to stop and submit to search, should, in fact, force be required.

b. A supplementary and simplified guidance paper on the Cuban crisis, placing it in the context of other postwar reactions to Communist aggression.

c. A sharpening of contingency planning with respect to a revolt in Cuba against Castro, including the possible political and psychological role of leaflet drops and a widened use of over-flight aircraft.

d. A paper to supplement "the Cuban base problem in perspective," focussing on the implications of Soviet moves in the past twenty-four hours.

e. An assessment of Free World reactions and pressures arising from our initiative, with recommendations on how they may be met in ways which do not obstruct and, if possible, reinforce the objectives stated in the President's address.

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